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The Class Action as Sheriff: Private Law Enforcement and 
Remedial Roulette 
 
PETA SPENDER* 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent conference paper,1 Jeff Berryman expressed dismay about the “piecemeal” 
undermining of the compensation principle.  The compensation principle requires that 
the plaintiff should as nearly as possible get the sum of money that will place him in 
the same position as if he had not suffered a wrong.2   Berryman argues that the 
principle has occupied a central position in modern private law “as a justification for 
who (victim) is allowed to commence an action in court, and for what (compensation), 
and as a limiting mechanism on the limits of what courts may justifiably do.  But its 
justificatory and limiting roles are becoming frayed.”3  He describes the demise of the 
principle as “death by a thousand cuts”.  Some of the deepest cuts have been inflicted 
by the modern class action.   
In this essay I will explore the effect of developments in class action law and 
practice upon remedial law, and investigate the state of health of the compensation 
principle.  My focus will be upon class actions in Australia, Canada, and the US, in 
descending order.  I will concentrate on compensatory, and to a lesser extent 
restitutionary remedies; leaving discussion of punitive, exemplary and treble damages 
for another occasion.   
My overall hypothesis is that whilst the compensatory principle is being 
assailed by the calls for the class action to deter corporate misconduct, the principle 
still acts as a moral compass.  Corrective justice has not entirely yielded to 
instrumentalism, but the current autonomous, individualistic, and substantive law 
model of corrective justice under private law needs to adjust to group procedural 
justice as practised in law firms and in the courts.    
Although remedial law is underpinned by several objectives such as 
compensation, restitution, punishment, coercion, and urgent and declaratory relief,4 
changes to facilitate class actions have overwhelmingly been justified on the basis of 
deterrence.  Many argue that deterrence of corporate misconduct is now the single 
most important objective of the class action.  Since the global village is predominantly 
inhabited by corporations, and the transactions undertaken by them cross national and 
continental boundaries, the class action operates like a privatized police officer 
targeting breaches of the law occurring in mass transactions.  In this respect, the class 
action is often referred to as the private attorney general, to indicate that it operates by 
the permission of the national state rather than under its auspices.  Class actions are 
                                              
* The author wishes to thank Peter Cane and the anonymous referee for their helpful 
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Remedies Symposium and providing editorial assistance.  
1  J. Berryman, The Compensation Principle, Conference Paper, Remedies Forum, Atlanta 2007, 
at 13. 
2  Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas. 25 at 39 (HL (Sc)) 
3  J. Berryman, The Compensation Principle, Conference Paper, Remedies Forum, Atlanta 2007, 
at 2. 
4  M. Tilbury Civil Remedies (Sydney: Butterworths, 1990) Vol 1 at 17. 
said to have a fusion of public and private roles5 in performing law enforcement tasks 
that would be unremedied by public officials.6   
In this respect, the class action can be likened to a sheriff, or bounty-hunter.  It 
operates to enforce the law, but like a Wild West sheriff it is likely to mete out rough 
justice, adopting a creed that accepts that the apprehension of crooks may justify some 
bending of the rules.  It may appear like the Sheriff of Nottingham with its hands in 
the till and a corrupt band of racketeers, or it may have a shiny sheriff’s badge like 
Deputy Dawg, ever at the ready to apprehend corporate miscreants.  The importance 
of the simile is to portray the continuum of law enforcement activity undertaken by 
the class action, and to observe that there is a tendency to vigilantism that forms part 
of its raison d’etre.  The centrality of law enforcement reflects the overarching 
importance of deterrence.  Cassels and Jones demonstrate this concern by the 
following quote which squarely juxtaposes the compensation principle to the 
deterrence function when discussing the judicial approval of class action settlements 
where a large portion of the recovery is paid to the lawyers: 
 
Consider the case where proposed counsel fees would consume all or virtually 
all of the proposed recovery.  Courts and commentators have expressed a 
visceral opposition to such a proposal, even where the claims at issue are so 
small as to be individually untenable.  In such a case the reaction indicates that 
deterrence is being considerably undervalued and the role of the plaintiff’s 
counsel in exercising the public rights ignored.  As distressing as it may seem, 
such an arrangement may be the only way or pursuing the wrongdoer, and 
courts ought to be alive to this possibility.7  
 
Their reference to the “visceral opposition” indicates that we may instinctively oppose 
deterrence for its own sake even if we agree that the class action is very good at 
securing it.   This essay will explore the challenges that this vision of the class action 
presents to the law of remedies, in particular to the compensation principle.  In Part B, 
the overall problem is identified - that the class action has wrested too many 
compromises from remedial law and there is a concern that the continued viability of 
the compensation principle is threatened by calls to promote the role of the class 
action in securing deterrence.  In order to interrogate the problem I examine the 
propositions made by Cassels and Jones, that: 
1. it is legitimate for the plaintiff lawyers to be paid the entire funds of a class 
action recovery in order to pursue wrongdoers; 
2. courts and commentators are viscerally opposed to such a proposal; 
3. this opposition persists even where claims are so low as to be individually 
untenable; 
4. this opposition ignores the role of plaintiff’s counsel in exercising public 
rights. 
The issue will be exemplified by the remedial difficulties created by vitamin antitrust 
litigation conducted in the US, Canada, and Australia, where the members of the class 
suffering the loss were not present, and in the tobacco excise litigation in Australia, 
where the plaintiffs were middlemen who were securing a windfall at the expense of 
                                              
5  O. Fiss, “The Political Theory of the Class Action” (1996) 53 Washington and Lee L. Rev. 21 
at 21. 
6  Ibid. at 22. 
7  J. Cassels and C. Jones, The Law of Large Scale Claims (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 369 
(footnotes omitted).  
the missing end-point consumers.  Proxy or ‘next best’ remedies such as in-kind 
settlements and cy-pres funds will also be discussed. 
In Part C, I examine the dominant theoretical analyses of private law by 
corrective justice theorists, but find them wanting due to the assumption of private 
law autonomy and individualism.  I will then map a middle ground by arguing that 
current theoretical models presuppose a hierarchy between substantive and procedural 
law.  This hierarchy is irrational, and the relationship between the two bodies of law 
must be interpreted dialogically.  In Part D, I apply the dialogical analysis to the 
problem of the missing end-point consumer in the antitrust litigation and the ‘middle-
man windfall’ in the tobacco litigation, to show that the poles of 
substantive/procedural law and individual/collective rights operate dialogically to 
craft solutions to challenges presented.  Most importantly, the vitamin trust and 
tobacco case studies demonstrate the continued vitality of the compensation principle, 
which operates expressly or in the sub-text of the judgments as a moral compass.  
 
B. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
1) The Nature of the Class Action and the Role of the Plaintiff Lawyer 
 
Both remedial and procedural law are based on the classic model, where litigation is 
characterized as a trial between two individuals (or two unitary interests) who are 
diametrically opposed, which is adjudicated on a ‘winner takes all’ basis.8  Similarly, 
relief is conceived as compensation for past wrongs, confined in its impact to the 
immediate parties.9  This conception has hampered both the development of group 
interests in procedural law, and innovation in the provision of remedies to group 
interests. The classic model also embodies understandings about the incentive 
structure of litigation and private law generally; expressed eloquently by Tilbury as 
follows: 
 
Remedies is essentially a plaintiff-orientated subject.  It is concerned with 
what matters most to the plaintiff in civil litigation, namely what he will get.10
 
The plaintiff in individual proceedings will generally perceive an injury or wrong and 
then seek out a lawyer who will advise him of available remedies.  The decision 
whether or not to pursue individual litigation will often depend on whether the 
remedy is valued by the client.  The incentive structure of a class action is vastly 
different.  Commonly, lawyers perceive the injury or wrong, seek out eligible lead 
plaintiffs, and solicit members of the class.11  The larger the membership of the class 
                                              
8 A. Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harvard L. Rev. 1281 at 
1282. 
9 A. Chayes, “The Supreme Court – 1981 Term – Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger 
Court” (1982) 96 Har. L. Rev. 4 at 8-9: 
“The issue was whether the particular plaintiff was entitled to the (usually 
compensatory) relief demanded from the particular defendant, when both plaintiff and 
defendant were private persons.  The question of the plaintiff’s standing to sue 
merged with the question of whether the plaintiff had stated a cause of action on the 
merits.” 
10  M. Tilbury, Civil Remedies, supra note 4 at 17. 
11  The empirical study of class actions undertaken by the RAND Institute showed that class 
action attorneys played myriad roles.   They stated ‘Some class actions arose after extensive individual 
litigation or efforts to resolve consumer complaints outside the courts; others were the first and only 
form of litigation resulting from a perceived problem. Sometimes class action attorneys uncovered an 
and the smaller the injury suffered by each individual, the greater the degree of lawyer 
control.  The structure of the class, the causes of action relied upon, and the remedies 
will be determined by strategy and expedience.   
Agency problems commonly arise in class actions, especially where the 
individual claims are small, and the members of the class have little or no incentive to 
monitor lawyers.  This has led to concerns about lawyers furthering their own 
interests at the expense of the class, particularly in settlements.12  Coffee has argued 
that high agency costs characterize class action litigation and permit opportunistic 
behaviour by lawyers.  As a result, it is more accurate to describe the plaintiff’s 
lawyer in a large class action as an independent entrepreneur than agent of the 
client.13   
Skepticism about entrepreneurialism underpins the visceral opposition to the 
role of the plaintiff’s counsel referred to by Cassels and Jones above.  The description 
of lawyers as ‘entrepreneurial’ is derisory, at least in the US.  However, in 
jurisdictions like Australia, which have cost shifting rules and ban contingency fees, 
class action litigation is inherently risky.  Although class action activity in Australia is 
permeated by entrepreneurialism there is also a strong element of cause-lawyering 
which motivates plaintiff lawyers.   
According to Sarat, cause-lawyering is a moral or political activity that 
encourages pursuit of the lawyer’s vision of the right, or the good, or the just.  It may 
also be described as ideological lawyering.14  It may be contrasted with conventional 
or client lawyering, which involves the deployment of a set of technical skills on 
behalf of ends determined by the client, not the lawyer.  In this conception, the 
practice of law is neither a domain for moral or political advocacy, nor a place to 
express the lawyer’s beliefs.15   
In a globalized society the class action is a weapon of choice for the cause-
lawyer in pursuit of multinational corporations.  Those who espouse cause-lawyering 
emphasize the political economy of globalization with its concomitant dissemination 
of neo-liberal values.  As stated by Scheingold and Sarat: 
 
…globalisation should not be equated with the construction of an open 
apolitical and beneficent global village.  Instead it is first and foremost a vast 
project in political economy that is restructuring the global order in ways that 
                                                                                                                                    
allegedly illegal practice on their own; sometimes angry consumers (or their attorneys) contacted them. 
Sometimes the lawyers first found out about a potential case from regulators or the media. Sometimes 
they jumped onto a litigation bandwagon that had been constructed by other class action attorneys. 
When they came later to the process, class action attorneys sometimes brought resources and expertise 
that helped conclude the case successfully for the class, but sometimes they seemingly appeared simply 
to claim a share of the spoils’.  See D. Hensler, B. Dombey-Moore, E. Giddens, J. Gross, E. Moller and 
N. Pace, Class action dilemmas: Pursuing public goals for private gain, Executive Summary (RAND 
ICJ, 1 January 1999) http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.1/MR969.1.pdf at 14, (last 
accessed 6/10/07). 
12  See generally the work of John Coffee, e.g. “The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: 
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action” (1987) 54 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 882 and 
“Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions” (1986) 86 Col. L. Rev. 669, and N. Scott, 
“Don’t forget me! The client in a class action lawsuit” (2002) 15 Georgetown J. of Legal Ethics 561. 
13  J. Coffee, ibid. at 882-883. 
14  For an exploration of the role of ideological plaintiffs in class action see V. Morabito, 
“Ideological plaintiffs and class actions - an Australian perspective” (2001) 34 U.B.C.L.Rev. 459. 
15  S. Scheingold and A Sarat, Something to believe in: politics, professionalism, and cause 
lawyering (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) at 2. 
maximise its compatibility with the values and interests of multinational 
enterprise.16
 
Moreover, the nation state loses some of its political steering capacity during the 
process of globalisation.17  The state’s enforcement power is bound to its territory 
while the subjects of state regulation, especially business firms, have increasingly 
expanded their activities beyond national borders. 18   New forms of governance 
operate above and beyond the nation state but the modes of enforcement at the 
international level are still weak.  Like other business firms, plaintiff class action 
firms have themselves expanded their activities beyond national borders and 
increasingly co-ordinate international enforcement activity.19   
Overall, the motives of the plaintiff lawyer will range from the self-interested 
entrepreneur to the idealist cause-lawyer, so the visceral opposition to Cassels and 
Jones’ proposition cannot be based on revulsion of opportunism alone.  Nevertheless, 
lawyers clearly control class actions and increasingly resort to class actions in a 
globalized environment, hence inadequate monitoring has the potential to cause 
inequities, as will be discussed below. 
 
2) ‘Pursuing Wrongdoers’ 
 
Traditionally, the goals of class actions have been access to justice, judicial economy 
and behaviour modification 20   However, increasingly, commentators assert that 
behaviour modification is the primary function and that compensation of class 
members is less important or irrelevant.  Such commentators urge that the sole 
function of the class action is deterrence, and that concerns about compensation are at 
best distracting, or at worst, damaging to the effectiveness of the procedure.21  For 
example, Gilles and Friedman argue that the focus should be entirely upon whether 
defendants internalize the social cost of their wrongdoing, and there is generally no 
legitimate utilitarian reason to care whether class members with small claims get 
compensated at all.  They refer to the influence of compensatory concerns as 
“compensationalist hegemony”.22   
There is no doubt that the class action is a highly effective mechanism for 
deterring breaches of the law by large and otherwise unaccountable institutions such 
as corporations.  Corporate law theorists regard class actions and a specialist plaintiff 
bar as vital to the development of creditor protection through tort law, and contend 
that tort law remains “undeveloped” in jurisdictions where they are not present.23  
                                              
16 Ibid. at 135. 
17  A. Scherer and G. Palazzo, “Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility”, draft paper 
to be published in A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, D. Siegel, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, (2008) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID989565_code721161.pdf?abstractid=989565&mirid
=1  at 4 (last accessed 6/10/07). 
18  Ibid. 
19  See H. Watt, “US class action star targets UK” The Sunday Times, March 11, 2007, regarding 
the opening of the London office of the US plaintiff firm Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll.   
20  V. Morabito, “Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out under Part IVA of the Federal Court of 
Australia Act 1976 (Cth)” (1994) 19 Mel.U.L.Rev. 615 at 627. 
21  M. Gilles and G. Friedman, “Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social 
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers” (2006) 155 U. Penn. L. Rev. 103. 
22  Ibid. at 107. 
23  G. Hertig and H. Kanda, ‘Creditor Protection’ in R. Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at 77. 
Research undertaken by the RAND Institute presents the empirical evidence that class 
actions have a deterrent effect and restrain corporate misconduct.  The report states: 
… [t]he corporate representatives whom we interviewed said that the burst of 
new damage class action lawsuits has played a regulatory role by causing them 
to review their financial and employment practices.  Likewise, some 
manufacturer representatives noted that heightened concerns about potential 
class action suits have had a positive influence on product design decisions.24
 
But there is some danger in the relentless pursuit of deterrence since it can descend 
into vigilantism.  Where class actions involve individually non-recoverable claims, a 
real issue arises as to whether the claim is pure deterrence without compensation, 
even though the conceptual structure of substantive law would demand the conferral 
of a remedy.  Moreover, Cassels and Jones invite us to face the possibility that the 
remedy is vestigial and immaterial to the goals of law.  
 
3) ‘Where the claims at issue are so small as to be individually untenable’ 
 
This section will provide examples of the remedial difficulties presented by classes 
where the claim is so small as to be individually untenable.   
 
a) The Stratospheric Class 
 
Class actions operate at various levels of abstraction.  Because an opt-out class action 
is defined by description, its members may be readily ascertainable and quantifiable, 
or the class may defy one’s imagination with its vastness.  For example, AWB Ltd, an 
Australian company, which allegedly paid bribes to the discredited Saddam Hussein 
regime to supply wheat in Iraq thereby breaching UN sanctions, has recently been 
named as defendant in four class actions on behalf of US farmers, 25  Australian 
farmers,26 AWB shareholders,27 and recently, by the victims of Hussein’s regime, in 
actions brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (US).  The class populated by AWB’s 
shareholders is readily ascertainable.  Similarly, ‘Australian wheat farmers’ may be 
ascertained with requisite inquiries.  ‘US farmers’ are one step removed, but in the 
absence of the need to prove reliance, the group may be ascertained, damages 
calculated globally and settlement or judgment funds distributed accordingly.   
What about the victims of Hussein’s regime?  Press reports asserted that 
lawyers for Iraqi citizens, Saadya Mastafa and Kafia Ismail, filed the class complaint 
on behalf of a group of people, “comprising victims of crimes perpetrated by the 
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq from 1996 to 2003, or their surviving immediate 
family members.”28  The action alleges that the defendants contributed to the injuries 
                                              
24  D. Hensler, B. Dombey-Moore, E. Giddens, J. Gross, E. Moller and N. Pace, Class action 
dilemmas: Pursuing public goals for private gain, Executive Summary (RAND ICJ, 1 January 1999) 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.1/MR969.1.pdf at 9, (last accessed 6/10/07). 
25  “AWB faces third US class action” ABC News 19/6/2007 available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/19/1955996.htm (last accessed 12/10/07).  
26  “US farmers begin legal action against AWB” ABC News 17/4/2007 available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/04/17/1899161.htm (last accessed 12/10/07). 
27  “AWB shareholders launch legal action” ABC News 13/4/2007 available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/04/13/1897021.htm (last accessed 12/10/07). 
28  “AWB faces new class action in the US”, Farm Online, 17 September 2007 available at 
http://fairfield.yourguide.com.au/detail.asp?class=national%20news&subclass=general&story_id=1054
848&category=general (last accessed 4/10/07). 
and damages sustained by the plaintiffs by giving substantial assistance to the Saddam  
regime, contrary to the “law of nations” and the Alien Tort Claims Act (US). 29   
Although there may be a nexus between AWB’s conduct and the victims of crimes 
perpetrated by Hussein in Iraq, there seems to be little chance that avenging AWB’s 
behaviour in the courts will lead to these victims receiving fair compensation.   
Other examples abound.  In February 2007, the Ninth Circuit affirmed class 
certification in Dukes v Wal Mart.30  In this case Betty Dukes is suing Wal-Mart 
alleging gender discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (US).  The class which 
Dukes represents is said to contain approximately 1.5 million women who worked for 
Wal-Mart from 1998. Dukes claims the women, like her, lost promotions and pay 
because of their gender.  The suit claimed substantial punitive damages.31  So, should 
the damages be distributed somehow to 1.5 million women, or should we be satisfied 
that wrongdoers are being pursued? 
 
b) The Disappearing Consumer 
 
A related development has been the proliferation of class actions where the end-point 
consumers are not represented in the litigation even though they are the group that has 
suffered loss.  A pertinent example is the litigation which followed an international 
price fixing and market sharing cartel for vitamins, which was uncovered in the late 
1990s.  Connor describes it as follows: 
 
Twenty-one chemical manufacturers fixed the prices of 16 vitamin products in 
nearly every country of the world for up to 16 years.  The cartels’ global sales 
during the conspiracies amounted to grand total of $34 billion.  Illicit profits 
made by the cartels totaled $10 billion.32
 
Prosecutions commenced in the US in 1997, Canada in 1998, Australia in 2000,33 and 
the European Commission in 2001.34  In the pecuniary penalty proceedings brought 
by the ACCC in Australia, several of the defendants admitted contravening 
Australia’s antitrust laws. 35   The Federal Court imposed pecuniary penalties 
amounting to A$26 million.36
Class actions were commenced in US, Canada, and Australia.  In the US, a 
multitude of class actions were filed in federal courts, but these were consolidated into 
one principal action that was argued in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia between 1999 and 2003.37 This consolidated suit had approximately 4,000 
                                              
29  “AWB faces new class action in the US”, Farm Online, 17 September 2007 available at 
http://fairfield.yourguide.com.au/detail.asp?class=national%20news&subclass=general&story_id=1054
848&category=general (last accessed 4/10/07). 
30  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007). 
31  M. Moller, “The Anti-Constitutional Culture of Class Action Law” (2007) Regulation, Vol. 30 
(2) 50 at 50. 
32  J. Connor, Global Price Fixing, (2007) at 360. 
33  Australian Competition Consumer Commission v Roche Vitamins Australia Pty Ltd, [2001] 
FCA 150 (28 February 2001). 
34  J. Connor, supra note 32 at 360. 
35  Section 45, Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Cth). 
36  Australian Competition Consumer Commission v Roche Vitamins Australia Pty Ltd, supra 
note 33 at [27]. 
37  In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P72,626 (7 June 1999). 
plaintiffs, being firms that had purchased bulk vitamins in the United States directly 
from the major manufacturers.  There were no end-point consumers in the class. 
According to Connor, the most successful private suits were launched in 
Canada where courts began authorizing substantial recoveries in the late 1990s.  The 
litigation was settled in the Supreme Court of British Columbia in April 2005 (for BC 
residents only) and in Ontario Superior Court (for the rest of Canada) in March 2005.  
There were 20 corporate defendants. 38   Unlike the United States, the courts 
considered three groups of plaintiffs simultaneously: direct purchasers of vitamins 
during the relevant period, intermediate purchasers, and ultimate consumers.  In the 
Ontario proceedings, the plaintiffs pursued the litigation using a two-stage model:  
1. On behalf of all purchasers of vitamins, they sought to hold the alleged 
conspirators accountable for the aggregate overcharge on all sales of vitamins in 
Canada by recovering aggregate damages.  
2. Class counsel developed a distribution model for the aggregate damages to be 
paid to or for the benefit of direct purchasers, intermediate purchasers, and 
consumers.39  
The matter settled for a total damage assessment of approximately $140 million.  
Motions were brought before Cumming J. in the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, 
for simultaneous certification of the class proceedings and approval of the settlement.  
In a settlement which is said to be the largest private antitrust suit in Canadian legal 
history, approximately 75% of the funds were distributed to direct purchasers and 
17% to indirect purchasers; the latter was handled through a cy-pres process40 by 
giving the funds to selected consumer and trade associations.41 As at the date of 
settlement, the proposed class definition for each of the Ontario actions was: 
 
All persons in Canada who purchased the relevant Class Vitamin(s) in Canada 
in the relevant Purchase Period(s) except the Excluded Persons and persons 
who are included in the corresponding British Columbia and Quebec 
Actions.42
 
Cumming J. commented that: 
 
The proposed class definitions embody all levels of purchasers, including 
those who purchased vitamins in raw form and those who purchased a product 
of which vitamins were a component part. … [T]he class necessarily has to 
include all levels of plaintiffs, from direct purchasers to intermediate 
purchasers to ultimate consumers.  All groups of class members must be 
present to ensure that the wrongdoers do not retain any of the fruits of their 
wrongdoing and to protect the rights of the class members to make a claim 
against a common fund to address their losses.43
 
Cumming J. found that the Court had power to make a cy-pres order,44 which was 
appropriate in this case because the class consisted of tens of thousands of 
                                              
38  J. Connor, supra note 32 at 407. 
39  Ford et al v. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. et al. (2005) 74 OR (3d) 758. 
40  This term will be defined and discussed under the next sub-heading. 
41  J. Connor, supra note 32 at 407. 
42  Ford v. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. et al., supra note 39 at [22]. 
43  Ibid. at [22]. 
44  Pursuant to sections 24 and 26 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, (Ont). 
intermediate purchasers and millions of consumers, and the complexity and 
administrative costs associated with direct distribution to members of these subgroups 
would have been prohibitive. 45   The cy-pres order was delivered in tranches, 
according to protocols which regulated the distribution to organizations which were 
closely aligned to the livelihood of the members of the sub-group.  Thus, for 
intermediate purchasers, many of whom were primary producers who used the 
vitamins for animals, the funds went to organizations like the Canadian Pork Council, 
Canadian Goat Society, and the Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg Marketing Agency.46  
Similarly, the funds belonging to the ultimate consumer sub-group went to broadly 
based community organizations such as Canadian Feed the Children and the Food 
Safety Network.47
In Australia, a class action was filed in 1999 against the three largest vitamin 
makers on behalf of buyers of vitamins.48 In the original claims, the group members 
were defined as: 
 
… persons who between 5 March 1992 and 5 July 1999 purchased in Australia 
all or some of vitamins A, B1, B2, B5 … , B6, B9 … , B12, C, E, … … either 
directly or indirectly by way of the purchase of foods, beverages, vitamin pills 
or capsules or other products which contained one or more class vitamins 
supplied by one or more of the respondents …49
 
However, by the time that settlement of the proceedings was judicially approved, the 
description of the class had become, ‘businesses [which] had, over the relevant period, 
spent $2000 or more upon vitamins or products containing vitamins’.  By this stage 
the class did not include any end-point consumers.50
The description of the class was amended in December 2003 to remove the 
end-point consumers of the vitamins who were arguably the only group who had 
suffered loss that could not be passed on further in the supply chain.  Because the lead 
plaintiff was a human-use consumer of the vitamins, it was necessary to seek the leave 
of the court to remove her as lead plaintiff51 as it amounted to a discontinuance of 
some of the claims.52  The reasons given by the plaintiff lawyers were, inter alia: 
 
• there is a serious risk of the applicant losing on some of the claims, particularly 
in relation to human-use vitamins; 
• a reformulation of the case so as to minimise the risk of losing on some claims, 
and potentially having to pay costs in relation to those claims, [was] reasonable 
and appropriate; 
• the United States experience in respect of claims by individual consumers, 
which suggested the total “loss” suffered by an individual consumer was likely 
to be small, made it reasonable to excise the claims of any consumers from the 
proceeding …;53 
 
                                              
45  Ford v. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. et al., supra note 39 at [79] – [80]. 
46  Ibid. at [91]. 
47  Ibid. at [99]. 
48  Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche (2003) 200 ALR 607 at [7]. 
49  Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 190 ALR 1 at [2]. 
50  Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (No 2) (2006) 236 ALR 322 at [26] 
51  Pursuant to s.33V, Federal Court Act, 1976 (Cth). 
52  Bray v Hoffman-La Roche Ltd [2003] FCA 1505. 
53  Ibid. at [33]. 
The court approved the substitution of group members who were substantial 
purchasers of animal vitamins as lead plaintiffs.54  In July 2006, Jessup J., in the 
Federal Court of Australia, approved a settlement of A$30.5 million plus legal fees of 
$10.5 million.55  Although his Honour noted that end-point consumers did not share 
in the settlement,56 it was nevertheless approved.  As far as the author is aware, no 
arrangements were made for distributions to end-point consumers, and a cy-pres 
scheme on the Canadian model was not available under Australian law.   
The vitamin class actions have been lauded as an important complementary 
measure to the public prosecution of the corporations involved.  Connor’s analysis of 
the litigation indicates that the typical criminal fine imposed was one-fifth to one-half 
of the estimate of the actual overcharges, ‘so the need for supplemental civil 
punishment would appear to still be strong’.57  ‘Coattail’58 class actions are often 
commenced after a public prosecution, and are said to provide reparation to the 
harmed, supply supplemental civil punishment, and boost the likelihood of deterrence 
of illegal conduct. 59   Is it important that those who have suffered the injury are 
absent? 
This issue is not confined to the vitamins litigation.  In Campbells Cash and 
Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif60 the plaintiffs were retailers and the defendants wholesalers of 
tobacco.  They held, respectively, a retailer’s and a wholesaler’s licence under state 
legislation until, on 5 August 1997, the High Court of Australia stuck down the 
licence provisions.61  Whilst the licensing scheme was in force, the defendants paid to 
the State of New South Wales licence fees referable to the value of tobacco sold by it 
from month to month.  The plaintiffs passed that fee on to consumers, as part of the 
purchase price of tobacco products.  The plaintiffs paid the licence fees for August 
1997, but the decision in Ha meant that the defendants were not liable to pay.  The 
plaintiffs sued in restitution to recover that part of the price paid by it to the 
defendants for tobacco that was referable to those unpaid licence fees. 62   The 
defendants refused to return the money paid for the licence fees and so the plaintiffs 
brought a representative action in the NSW Supreme Court.  The class represented 
were tobacco retailers, not tobacco consumers. 
The Fostif litigation raises a further element of windfalls.  Where the end-
point consumers are not present, and distributions are made to participants further up 
supply chains that have already passed on the cost, they will be double–dipping.  It is 
exacerbated in this case because the restitution remedy focuses upon the gain to the 
defendant rather than loss to the claimant as required by a damages claim.  
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c)  In-Kind Settlements and the Cy-Pres Remedies 
 
The US courts have developed an elaborate framework of in-kind remedies63 in class 
action settlements.  In-kind payments are “non-cash compensation from the defendant 
to the plaintiff class, usually in the form of a coupon or scrip that class members can 
apply toward the purchase of the defendant's products in the future”.64  In the US, 
they have been used for many commodities such as foodstuffs, groceries, home sites, 
legal texts, and services such as air travel and brokerage fees.65  The valuation of in-
kind payments is extremely difficult,66 the redemption rates of coupons low,67 and it 
foists the defendant’s products onto a class that may otherwise be unwilling to 
purchase them.68  Most importantly, there is trenchant concern that excessive attorney 
fees are often negotiated as part of the settlements.69  Consequently, there is doubt 
that in-kind remedies provide either meaningful compensation or have deterrent value.  
Coupon settlements in interstate class proceedings are now regulated by the US Class 
Action Fairness Act, 2005.70  There appears to be little interest in emulating the US 
experiment in Australia71 or Canada. 
Another option is the cy-pres remedy.  Cy-pres doctrine is the vehicle by 
which the intentions of a donor may be given effect ‘as nearly as possible’ in 
circumstances where literal compliance cannot be effectuated.72  Originally derived 
from trusts, it has been developed extensively as a remedial device for class actions.  
For example, a price-rollback cy-pres is a distribution of damages to individuals by 
way of a lowering of the purchase price of the defendant’s product for a set time 
period.73 Whereas, in an organisational-distribution cy-pres, unclaimed class action 
fund monies are ‘given to a designated entity and used to fund a project, institution or 
study which will be likely to indirectly assist the class members as a group’.74  This 
method of damages distribution has received much favourable support, particularly to 
create consumer trust funds, 75  although some concern has been expressed about 
strangers to the litigation receiving a windfall benefit on a price-rollback.76  
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Legislation in Canada makes statutory provision for class action cy-pres 
distributions,77 and the doctrine in the US has developed through ‘creative judicial 
decision-making’. 78   Australia has not endorsed a class action cy-pres remedy 
pursuant to either statute or case law.  The Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) report,79 which formed the basis of the Federal Court’s class action powers 
under Part IVA Federal Court Act,80 expressly disclaimed the wider cy-pres model in 
favour of a model which allowed only for the unclaimed residue of judgment or 
settlement fund set aside by the defendant for distribution to the class of plaintiffs to 
be returned to the defendant.   
It is worth considering why the ALRC chose the narrow model.  Mulheron has 
stated that the ALRC’s rejection of cy-pres distributions was ‘comprehensive’ and 
summed up the ALRC’s reasoning as follows: 
 
First … a class action procedure was intended to compensate class members.  
It was not intended to penalise defendants or to deter to any greater extent than 
provided for under the existing law, and a cy-pres award was inconsistent with 
that primary compensatory function. 
Secondly, any damages award payable by the defendant ought to be matched 
as closely as possible to the class members’ entitlement (thus only victims 
who came forward with valid claims should represent the defendant’s liability 
to that class).  That precluded organisational-distribution payments to some 
third party entity, or price-rollback reductions for future purchasers who were 
not repeat purchasers and who were not plaintiffs themselves. 
Thirdly … a cy-pres distribution could result in a windfall to non-class 
members, by obtaining damages in return for no loss or injury caused by the 
defendant. 
Fourthly, the mechanism of damages distribution had nothing to do with 
enhancing access to the courts, the primary goal of a class actions regime.81
 
The ALRC made the following comments at paragraph 239: 
 
Any money ordered to be paid by the respondent should be matched, so far as 
possible, to an individual who has a right to receive it.  If this cannot be done, 
there is no basis for confiscating the residue to benefit group members 
indirectly … simply because the procedure used was the grouping procedure.  
It would be a significant extension of present principles of compensation to 
require the respondent to meet an assessed liability in full even if there is no 
person to receive the compensation.  Any such change would be in the nature 
of a penalty, and would go beyond procedural reform.  It has nothing to do 
with enhancing access to the courts. 
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The ALRC report places considerable importance upon compensation as the bedrock 
of the inquiry.  This is an example of the compensation principle’s role as a moral 
compass in class action jurisprudence.    
A recent discussion paper issued by the Victorian Law Reform Commission 
(‘VLRC’) Civil Justice Enquiry has raised the option of a cy-pres fund which can be 
used to create a Justice Fund to finance access to justice initiatives.82 The VLRC First 
Exposure Draft states that: 
 
It is proposed that the court should have power to order cy-pres type remedies 
where: (a) there has been a proven contravention of the law, (b) a financial or 
other pecuniary advantage (‘unjust enrichment’) has accrued to the person or 
entity contravening the law as a result of such contravention (c) a loss suffered 
by others is able to be quantified and (d) it is not possible, practicable or cost 
effective to identify and compensate some or all of those who have suffered 
the loss.83
This recommendation contemplates a wider cy-pres remedy than that recommended 
by the ALRC - the trigger for the court’s power to set up the fund is the defendant’s 
unjust enrichment rather than an unclaimed residue.  The unjust enrichment model is 
also wider than a comparable provision in Ontario, which gives the court power to 
direct any means of distribution of amounts awarded by way of damages.84   
This proposal could enhance access to the courts by subsequent litigants 
thereby satisfying the ALRC’s fourth criterion because it is proposed that the cy-pres 
fund be used for litigation funding.  However the proposal bypasses the ‘next best 
option’ policy which underpins the cy-pres alternative to the distribution of damages.  
There is no attempt to confer even an indirect benefit on members of the class (unless 
it could be argued that later public interest litigation indirectly benefits members of 
the class); hence it clearly challenges aspects of the compensation principle.  It also 
potentially raises constitutional questions about the ambit of judicial power.85
The test proposed by the VLRC is based on gain to the defendant as compared 
to the ALRC’s focus upon compensation.  The VLRC proposal is intended in part to 
alleviate the problems associated with windfall gains, which arose in the Fostif and 
Roxburgh cases.  There may be some questions as to whether the ‘unjust enrichment’ 
inquiry is substantive or procedural and this introduces significant uncertainty.  
Nevertheless, a cy-pres distribution provides flexibility in class actions and can be 
remarkably effective when used judiciously.  However, a preliminary inquiry must be 
made concerning the ALRC’s contention that, the cy-pres fund is in the nature of a 
penalty because the absence of anyone to receive compensation takes the issue 
‘beyond procedural reform.’  This point demonstrates the boundaries of the proper 
role of the class action as a procedural device for enforcing private law. 
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4) ‘The role of the plaintiff’s counsel in exercising public rights is ignored’  
 
In this part of the quote above, Cassels and Jones are referring to the so-called 
regulatory or ‘public law’ role of the class action.  They urge Canadian courts to 
recognize this role through an increasing emphasis on deterrence.86  Although many 
commentators regard the class action as playing a critical role in law enforcement as 
the ‘private attorney general’,87 it is important to recognise the appropriate ambit of 
public and private enforcement of the law so as to discourage vigilantism.  Class 
actions perform law enforcement tasks that would be unremedied by public 
enforcement due to poor resources.88   
Dagan describes this approach to law enforcement as ‘blunt instrumentalism’, 
which portrays private law as merely one form of regulation.  On this view, private 
law is indistinguishable from legislation, and “nothing prevents private law from 
pursuing such aims as condemning anti-social behavior or promoting the interests of 
parties other than the plaintiff and the defendant.”  Blunt instrumentalism perceives 
civil suits as one “mechanism whereby the state authorizes private parties to enforce 
the law.”89  
Redish argues that the Cassels and Jones’ portrayal of class action lawyers 
exercising public rights is spurious and anti-democratic.  He claims, that under private 
law, the plaintiff may choose whether or not to enforce his private rights, but in class 
actions, bounty hunter lawyers bring suit through the creation of faux classes 
comprised of passive right holders who do not receive ‘real’ compensation, despite 
the intention of the substantive law.  He states: 
 
…no plaintiff is ever required to enforce his private compensatory right.  To 
the contrary, the substantive law vests that choice exclusively in the individual 
victim.  Thus, in such situations, any incidental benefit to the public interest is 
wholly contingent upon the private victim's decision to seek to judicially 
enforce her substantively created remedy.90
 
There is an element of voluntarism which is critical to private law.  The excessive 
focus upon deterrence raises the question of the standing of litigants where a class is 
entirely passive.  I will investigate this further by theoretical and conceptual analyses. 
 
C. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 
 
Class actions generally enforce statutory or private laws which set up a bilateral 
relationship between the person who breaches the law and a person who suffers an 
injury as a result.  Although the individual’s injury may be so minor as to be either 
unperceived or not worth remedying, the nominal injury still forms part of the 
framework of the law which allows for access to courts and a principled assessment of 
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the defendant’s obligation to make recompense.  Therefore, the injury provides 
standing to the plaintiff to pursue private enforcement even in an aggregated claim, 
and the injury remains the touchstone of the moral balance between the plaintiff and 
the defendant.   
Corrective justice theorists refer to this moral balance as ‘correlativity,’ 91  
described by Zipursky as “a neat pairing: a defendant who must pay to the plaintiff 
not just any amount, but precisely the amount of the plaintiff's injury; and a plaintiff 
who is entitled to receive precisely the amount of her injury, and is entitled to receive 
it not simpliciter, but entitled to receive it from the defendant”.92   The concept of 
corrective justice itself “is based on a simple and elegant idea: when one person has 
been wrongfully injured by another, the injurer must make the injured party whole.”93
As applied to damages, the: 
 
…stated goal of the damages remedy is compensation of the plaintiff for 
legally recognised losses.  This means that the plaintiff should be fully 
indemnified for his loss, but that he should not recover any windfall.  Stated in 
this way, damages is an instrument of corrective justice, an effort to put the 
plaintiff in his or her rightful position.94
 
Dagan describes the corrective justice theorists as ‘private law autonomists’ 
since private law in this view, “is a realm with its own inner intelligibility, isolated 
from the social, economic, cultural, and political realms.  This isolation derives from 
the bilateral logic of private law adjudication.”95  The autonomist analysis explains 
the justificatory role of private law very well because correlativity justifies to 
defendants “both the identity of the beneficiary of any liability imposed on them and 
the exact type and degree (or magnitude) of that liability.”   But the analysis obscures 
“the rich social fabric that serves as the inevitable context for the parties' 
relationship.” 96    
Although the message of the corrective justice theorists is elegant, it is based 
on an individualistic, autonomous, static view of the substantive law.  In order to 
effectively theorise the issue it is necessary to develop a collectivist, contextualised, 
dynamic, and procedural account of the role of the class action and its relationship to 
remedial law. It is therefore necessary to seek the middle ground between 
instrumentalism and autonomism, and along the way delve into the murky realm of 
law in action.  To quote Cane: 
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[p]rivate law is not only a system of norms but also a set of institutional 
arrangements for creating and sustaining norms, and a set of social practices 
around those norms and institutions.97  
 
1) Mapping the Middle Ground 
 
The analysis has proceeded so far on the basis that there is a clash between the 
instrumental goals of class actions as a species of procedural law, which promote 
access to justice, judicial economy, and behaviour modification, 98  and the 
justificatory and limiting roles of the compensation principle as a species of remedial 
law.  The particular concern is that the class action bullies the compensation principle 
into submission and the justificatory and limiting objectives have been unnecessarily 
sacrificed to the exigencies of class action litigation.  
This reasoning is based on an understanding that procedural law is subordinate 
to substantive law.  I will issue a challenge to revisit this hierarchy and to more 
accurately explain the relationship between these two bodies of law.  Brudner’s 
analysis of the common law will be invoked to portray substantive and procedural law 
as two poles in a dialogic community.  Whilst the two poles appear to be in conflict, 
in fact they track one another and each requires the other for its own coherence so as 
not to displace or subvert the value it tracks.99  In other words, “the relentless pursuit 
of a single value destroys that value”.100  
Jacob considered that there is a vital and essential dichotomy between the 
substantive law - the function of which is to define, create, confer or impose legal 
rights and duties - and procedural law - the function of which is to provide the 
machinery, the manner or the means by which legal rights and duties may be 
enforced.101  
Remedial law falls within the substantive category as explained by Tilbury: 
 
The law of remedies is that branch of substantive law which deals with the 
types of redress available in response to the imposition of liability on a party in 
civil litigation.102  
 
Substantive and procedural laws have different functions, though classifying a law as 
one or the other is often problematic. 103 Such categorization might not be important if 
the function of the relevant body of law is clear, but, historically, jurists have fostered 
the categorization in order to subordinate procedural law.  This view may be traced to 
the work of Bentham, who first described procedural law as ‘adjectival’ and 
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considered that “the only defensible object … of the adjective branch of law … is the 
maximisation of the execution and effect given to the substantive branch of the 
law”. 104   I have argued elsewhere that judges use the terms ‘substantive’ and 
‘procedural’ normatively, to signify a hierarchy in which ‘substantive’ rights should 
not be displaced, rather than functionally to signify the operation of the doctrine in 
question. 105   Consequently, doctrines such as legal professional privilege and 
limitation laws are ‘recruited’ into the substantive category so as to preserve aspects 
of their operation from intrusion or to serve other instrumental goals.   
This hierarchy has become an article of faith, but upon revisiting the issue it is 
difficult to justify.  Firstly, each body of law protects fundamental social values – 
substantive law protects values such as property, family and citizenship, whereas 
procedure protects values such as dignity,106 participation,107 and truth, or perhaps 
less ambitiously, accuracy.108  The values are different but neither set of values is 
more important than the other.  Secondly, there are indications that procedure and 
process values are becoming more influential.  Two developments are at play.  The 
first concerns the proliferation of procedural contexts in which substantive laws are 
asserted, e.g. tribunals, arbitration, mediation, and industry ombudsmen.  In this sense, 
procedure is said to be trans-substantive.109 In each forum due process concerns will 
operate to negotiate the best procedure for that context.  The second development is 
the work by social psychologists, which indicates that citizens’ perception of fairness 
in legal settings is linked to process rather than outcomes.110  The third reason to 
dispute the substantive-procedural hierarchy is that procedural law will often curtail or 
nullify deliberation about, or adjudication of, substantive issues, e.g. by summary 
judgment.  Ineffective procedure will not only fail to effectively resolve disputes but 
will also stymie the development of substantive law. 
Overall, the importance of the operation of procedural law is demonstrated by 
Zipursky in relation to tort: 
 
We cannot grasp the phenomenon of a tortfeasor's liability to a plaintiff unless 
we place it within a more accurate procedural context.  The state does not 
impose liability on its own initiative.  It does so in response to a plaintiff's suit 
demanding that the defendant be so required. … In permitting and 
empowering plaintiffs to act against those who have wronged them, the state is 
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not relying upon the idea that a defendant has a pre-existing duty of repair. 
Instead, it is relying on the principle that plaintiffs who have been wronged are 
entitled to some avenue of civil recourse against the tortfeasor who wronged 
them.  Civil recourse, not corrective justice, explains the concepts and 
principles embedded in our tort law and displayed in its plaintiff-defendant 
structure.111
 
Coming back to the effect of class actions upon remedial law, much of the analysis of 
remedial law “assumes [that] the requirements of procedural law have been 
satisfied.” 112   This assumption is important to keep in mind when providing 
prescriptive accounts of the interaction.  By stating that the compensation principle 
occupies a central position in substantive law and warning about the encroachment of 
procedure, Berryman relies on this assumption and upon the substantive-procedural 
hierarchy.  
An alternative analysis to the substantive-procedural hierarchy is Brudner’s 
conception of dialogic community, which is derived from Hegel’s Geist concept.113   
Following on from Hegel’s interest in resolving “the apparently fixed dichotomies of 
everyday thinking into a whole of which the formerly independent extremes are 
constituent parts”,114 Brudner argues that the common law’s unity involves a similar 
synthesis of several interrelated dichotomies. 115   For example, substantive and 
procedural doctrines compete with each other for supremacy.  However, they are in a 
dialogic community, therefore, the excesses of both are mitigated by the other.  As 
stated by Lucy, “[d]ialogic community is the unity of subunities within the common 
law, the realization that alleged doctrinal opposites are in fact connected”.116  The 
main interest in a dialogical community is not that it provides us with reasons for 
action, 117  but, rather, that it reshapes the inquiry as between substantive and 
procedural law.  Procedural law is not subordinated and substantive and procedural 
doctrines interact on a level playing field.   
Brudner’s analysis operates on a number of levels – doctrinal, instrumental, 
methodological and normative.  In my view, the common law is subject to perpetual 
dialogic movement between many tensions that are discussed in this essay, i.e. 
public/private, substantive/procedural, entrepreneurial/cause-focussed, 
corrective/distributive, and individualistic/communitarian. 
Brudner’s vision also affirms the poles of individualism and communitarian 
political philosophy. 
   
On the normative level, the overarching truth of dialogic community is that we 
are both formally free, self-interested rights-bearers and agents whose 
identities are constituted by our membership in communities, groups and 
traditions.118
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Practically speaking this analysis has two consequences.  Firstly, it suggests that 
where class action and remedial doctrines clash, there should be an attempt to 
reconcile the demands of both bodies of law, e.g. it is appropriate to assess damages 
globally but that a global assessment of damages should nevertheless proceed on an 
principled, adapted corrective justice model (loss to the plaintiffs), rather than a 
distributive justice model (gain to the defendant).  Secondly, the subject of remedial 
law is generally the individual and this conception needs to be adapted to group 
interests and mass transactions.  Therefore, there should be recognition that 
distribution of loss to large classes will often render the litigation futile due to cost, 
but that distribution in kind through a cy-pres fund recognises the superior value of 
the class action as one of the few enforcement devices that genuinely disciplines 
multinational corporations, particularly in a globalised context.   
 
D. FINDING THE LOST CONSUMER 
 
Here, I apply the dialogic model discussed above to the problem of the disappearing 
consumer, previously discussed.  I will start with the premise that antitrust class 
action litigation does have a deterrent effect, but that group actions should mirror the 
correlativity in the corrective justice model, therefore, we should retain the 
compensation principle as a ‘moral compass’.  Bipolarity needs to be adapted to a 
group context, and substantive and procedural law should interact dialogically in 
order to maintain the values of procedural law (viability of the proceedings and 
participation by end-users) and substantive law (protecting competitive markets and 
the compensation principle).  
I believe that correlativity operates across the substantive and procedural axes 
and that the compensation principle operates in the sub-text, both in its limiting and 
justificatory roles.  The two juridical concerns which flow through the case study are, 
firstly, that the true victim of unlawful conduct is compensated, and secondly, that an 
intermediary who has passed on a loss should not obtain a windfall.  The difficulty 
that the courts have faced is reconciling the mass nature of the transactions with the 
individualized nature of correlativity.  Even if we assume the compensation principle 
applies, and damages may be measured globally, further questions arise, particularly 
in relation to proof.  Should each consumer be required to prove that the act of the 
defendant caused a loss to them?  If so, how might group proceedings be realistically 
conducted without unraveling in a mass of detail?  If not, how do we determine how 
compensation should be distributed?  Is it necessary that the consumers receive 
something or can we use proxies for compensation, e.g. by distribution to charities 
though cy-pres remedies?  The following will provide a range of answers to these 
question by the courts in the US, Canada, and Australia.  Many of the answers are 
unsatisfying, but overall they do demonstrate both the dialogic nature of the exercise 
and the continuing resonance of the compensation principle as a ‘moral compass’. 
 
1) The Cases – End-point Consumers of Vitamins 
 
The 1968 case of Hanover Shoe Inc v United Shoe Machinery Corp119 is a useful 
starting point.  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had monopolized the shoe 
machinery industry in violation of the Sherman Act, resulting in an overcharge.  The 
defendants argued that the plaintiff class had passed on some or the entire overcharge, 
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and, therefore, was not entitled to recover damages.  The US Supreme Court rejected 
this defence, holding that the passing-on defence was not available to the defendants. 
The court held that if the passing-on defence was allowed, the alleged co-conspirators 
“would retain the fruits of their illegality”120 because indirect purchasers, having only 
modest claims, would be unlikely to sue. 
Subsequently, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,121 decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1977, determined that only those who had directly purchased goods or 
services from conspirators to a price-fixing scheme were entitled to recover damages.  
Awarding damages to downstream purchasers, e.g. consumers who had bought the 
price-fixed product from a retailer, who in turn bought it from the manufacturer, were 
denied recovery because of the difficulty of determining how much or how little of 
the conspiracy-induced price increase middlemen had passed on to ultimate 
consumers, and because letting both middlemen and consumers sue for damages 
would unduly complicate class action litigation.122   
The Supreme Court concluded that any attempt to apportion an overcharge 
between direct and indirect purchasers would “add whole new dimensions of 
complexity to … damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness.” 123   
Additionally, the Court held that allowing indirect purchasers to sue for damages 
“would create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants” if, at the same time, 
defendants were prohibited from asserting a passing-on defence against claims by 
direct purchasers.124
An expert economist commented upon this decision as follows: 
 
 … although the amount of pass-on depends upon the structure of the 
intermediate market, the degree of product differentiation, and other variables, 
it is highly probable that most of the burden of a price-fixing conspiracy falls 
upon ultimate consumers rather than the middlemen who are immediate 
purchasers from the conspirators. Thus, justice is denied to the consumers.125  
 
The Illinois Brick decision has been described as “the reciprocal of the rule 
established by the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe”, and was instrumental in 
excluding end-point consumers from the US vitamins cartel class actions during the 
1990s – 2000s.  Illinois Brick was the centerpiece of submissions made by the vitamin 
manufactures in summary judgment applications to exclude end-point consumers 
from the classes.  For example, in 2001, six members of a class action were the 
subject of a motion for summary judgment by the defendants.  They had purchased 
vitamin pre-mix products from non-defendant manufacturers during the relevant 
period.   
Hogan C.J. found that the six plaintiffs purchased pre-mix products from non-
defendant suppliers, who in turn had obtained the vitamins to make the pre-mix from 
defendants – “that fact alone” rendered “the six plaintiffs indirect purchasers of the 
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defendants”.  Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiffs' damage claims were barred 
by Illinois Brick.126  The plaintiffs argued that an ‘umbrella theory’ of liability should 
apply to preserve their claim, but this was rejected following the case of FTC v. Mylan 
Laboratories Inc, 127  which found that, “the addition of indirect purchasers to the 
litany of possible antitrust plaintiffs threatened to mire courts in unduly complicated 
and speculative damages proceedings”. 128   Hogan C.J. found that “the causal 
connection between plaintiffs' injury and the alleged conspiracy is necessarily 
attenuated by significant intervening factors, such as independent pricing decisions of 
the non-conspiring suppliers of pre-mix.”129
The problem has been partially rectified at the state level in the US where 
about 20 states have enacted legislation to provide antitrust damages without the 
Illinois Brick passing-on barrier.  However, state claims may be affected by the 
passage of the federal Class Action Fairness Act, 2005, which seeks to reduce the 
amount of state level litigation.130 The only recourse in federal courts for indirect 
buyers injured by price-fixing was to lobby the attorney general to bring a parens 
patriae suit for them.131  
In 1999 a group of US state attorney-generals began negotiations with the six 
largest vitamin manufacturers seeking damages for indirect purchasers of bulk 
vitamins who were overcharged by cartelization.  In 2000, a settlement between the 
vitamin makers and 24 attorney-generals was reached whereby the companies agreed 
to pay these 24 states $305 million.  Commercial indirect buyers who conducted 
business in those states were entitled to file a compensation claim and receive shares 
of a pool of $198 million.  Households were ‘indirectly compensated’ by ‘appropriate 
state programs’.132  For example, “New York State announced that it would use the 
consumer portion for grants to nonprofit organizations and local governments for 
programs related to prenatal care, child nutrition, and alleviation of hunger”.133  
Although commentators have argued that the US settlement significantly 
under-compensated US consumers,134 at least there was some attempt to distribute to 
end-point consumers.  This was achieved in the Canadian litigation by a cy-pres 
remedy135 as an exercise of judicial power, whereas the intervention of the attorney-
generals in the US was an exercise in executive power.  Overall, the issue raises 
questions about the capacity of the courts to structure compensation in class actions to 
end-point consumers, and demonstrates a sequencing of paired attempts to achieve 
this - judicial/executive, public/private, substantive/procedural - but within a 
compensatory framework.   
As far as the author is aware, no attempt was made to distribute to end-point 
consumers in the Australian litigation after the original end-point consumer was 
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removed as lead plaintiff.  The Illinois Brick case was not cited in the Australian cases, 
but the summary of the plaintiff lawyers’ reasons for changing the description of the 
class in the 2003 application seems to point to difficulties of proof.136
 
2) The Cases – End-point Consumers of Tobacco 
 
In Australia, the issue of the lost end-point consumer arose after the High Court struck 
down state taxes on tobacco as an unconstitutional excise in 1997. 137   When 
wholesalers refused to refund the unconstitutional licence fees, several coattail class 
actions were commenced by retailers claiming the sums as money had and received.  
Both the Full Federal Court138 and the High Court in Boxborough’s case,139 wrestled 
with an application by a class of middlemen retailers who admittedly had passed on 
the cost of the licence fees to consumers.  Although the Federal Court attempted to 
block the claim upon substantive law grounds, the High Court rejected this analysis.  
In the subsequent Fostif proceedings, between two ‘equally undeserving’140 groups of 
litigants, the High Court provided an extremely narrow test of standing so as to curtail 
the actions on procedural grounds.   
The language of the judgments, and the commentary, demonstrates the 
continuing vitality of both the limiting and justificatory roles of the compensation 
principle as the courts attempted to reconcile the claim before them with one that was 
not, i.e. the end-point consumers who had suffered the loss.  Note the comments of 
Bryan and Ellinghaus regarding the Full Federal Court decision: 
 
The overall impression gained from a reading of the majority judgment is one 
of straining to find reasons for refusing restitution.  The policy informing this 
attitude is not hard to find.  Emphasis was placed at several points in the 
judgment on the fact that the retailers had recouped the amount they had paid 
in respect of tax from cigarette purchasers. … The moral force of the 'windfall' 
aspect of the case pervades the majority judgment, supplying the pretext for 
the application of a particularly restrictive and inappropriate test for implying 
terms and for reading down the criteria for the award of restitution. … It is 
hard to dispel the notion that Roxborough was ultimately decided on the basis 
of the majority's aversion to conferring a perceived windfall on the retailers by 
judicial decision.141
 
It was found by the High Court that the fact that the appellants passed on the invalid 
licence fee to consumers in the form of higher retail prices was not by itself a general 
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defence upon which the respondent could rely against a claim in restitution.  Kirby J. 
cited the Illinois Brick case in support of this proposition, 142  commenting that 
determining the damage which had been passed on may only be ascertained after a 
“highly sophisticated theoretical and factual inquiry”.143
Although the result was clear under the law of restitution, it is unsatisfactory 
and Kirby J. invited legislative intervention.144  There is more work to be done here, 
especially on developing strategies for the participation of end-point consumers 
personally, or by proxy, e.g. through a cy-pres remedy.  On the last occasion that the 
High Court dealt with the issue, it tightened up class action standing rather than 
attempting to redistribute gain.  In the result, the middlemen did not receive a windfall 
but those who suffered loss were still not represented.145  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
[W]e may be better off in this country with more cops and fewer vigilantes.146
 
In the end, the key question is whether class action litigation is socially beneficial.147  
Although we may decry the remedial distortions and compromises that lay in the 
wake of class actions, our opposition must be linked to sub-optimal outcomes.  Sub-
optimal outcomes might be seen in poor allocations which result in exploitation of 
passive right holders, or windfall gains to middlemen, or unprincipled remedial 
doctrine.  However, in my view, an autonomous theoretical view of private law 
cannot resolve the issue.  Rather, the answer lies in the middle ground, which is 
reached in the dialogic interplay of substantive and procedural law.   
The case study reveals that far from suffering mortal wounds the 
compensation principle operates as a moral compass to guide judicial decision-
making.  This is manifested expressly and positively, e.g. in the Hanover Shoe case, 
or negatively and implicitly by the Full Federal Court of Australia in the Roxborough 
case where the court was prepared to bend the substantive law of restitution to avoid 
an outcome that ran contrary to the spirit of the compensation principle.  It is also 
present in the sub-text of in-kind arrangements such as cy-pres remedies and the 
settlements negotiated by the US state attorney-generals in the vitamins litigation.  
These arrangements recognise that compensation is always a best guess, and, 
consequently, adopt a substitutive and symbolic strategy to put the class members in 
the same position as if they had not sustained the wrong.  Yet the operation of 
procedural law at various points requires that the compensation principle shifts, or 
adapts, to the exigencies of the action.  At these points, effective procedural law 
demands an alternative if strict adherence to the compensation principle would defeat 
the claim due to cost, e.g. where claims are small and thinly spread (Cumming J.’s 
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judgment in Ford v Hoffman-La Roche), or where individual issues threaten to 
overpower the collective benefit, e.g. the Illinois Brick doctrine. 
The compensation principle remains a moral compass by providing a ‘True 
North’ against which the court may navigate the substantive and procedural, the 
entrepreneurial and ideological, and the individual and collective poles in order to 
negotiate a just outcome.  Far from being dead it remains a vital navigational tool 
assisting class actions to enforce the law. 
 
